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ABSTRACT
This dissertation consists of three essays on banking. The first two chapters analyze,
theoretically and empirically, the relationship between bank capital and macroeconomic
activity. The third chapter addresses a policy question about financial deepening in some
emerging market economies.
The first chapter develops a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model to examine
the impact of macroprudential regulation on the bank’s financial decisions and the implica-
tions for the real sector. It explicitly incorporates costs and benefits of capital requirements.
We model an occasionally binding capital constraint and approximate it using an asymmet-
ric nonlinear penalty function. It is seen that higher capital requirements can dampen
business cycle fluctuations and stronger regulation can induce banks to hold buffers and
hence mitigate an economic downturn. We also see that higher capital requirements can
enhance the welfare of the economy as a whole. Lastly, we find that switching to a counter-
cyclical capital requirement regime can help moderate business cycle fluctuations and raise
welfare.
v
The second chapter empirically evaluates the impact of bank capital on lending patterns
using an innovative instrumenting strategy. We construct an unbalanced quarterly panel
of around nine thousand commercial banks over sixty quarters, from 1996 to 2010. Using
different measures of capital, we find a moderate relationship between bank equity and
lending. The relationship is also found to differ by size. The bigger banks have a greater
responsiveness of lending to capital than smaller ones.
The third chapter evaluates financial deepening in the West African Economic and
Monetary Union (WAEMU) and compares their performance with other top performers in
Africa. First, we use an unbalanced panel of 16 countries and 158 banks and document
some key areas that need immediate policy attention. Next, we use the financial possibility
frontier methodology to benchmark the performance of some important economies in our
sample, with respect to each other and their estimated potential. We find that the WAEMU
countries perform poorly compared to the control group and their own estimated potential.
We make policy recommendations to solve this problem and increase financial depth.
vi
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1Chapter 1
Macroprudential Regulation and
Macroeconomic Activity
“The reason I raise the capital issue so often, is that, in a sense, it solves
every problem.” - Alan Greenspan to the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission
1.1 Introduction
The banking sector is one of the most regulated ones in the world today. There are different
forms of regulation but capital regulation is of paramount importance because bank capital
is an extremely good indicator of the financial soundness of the bank and also its risk taking
abilities.1 Bank equity is of utmost importance but has not really been given its due by
traditional monetary macroeconomics albeit the trend seems to be changing recently. As
has been documented in Van den Heuvel (2009), in most bank related work, the focus is on
reserve/liquidity requirements and how they affect the decision to accept demand deposits.
In these studies, the bank capital regulation is mostly discussed as an afterthought. My work
focuses on bank capital regulation, capital buffers and the implications for the economy.
1Berger, Herring and Szego (1995) and Santos (2001) contain surveys on the motivations behind capital
regulation
2The commercial banks in the United States face capital requirements based on the the
Basel Core Banking Principles. In December 2011, the Government of the United States
announced that the Basel III guidelines will be fully implemented soon.
I develop a general equilibrium model with a representative household, a representative
bank and a non financial firms sector divided into a capital goods producing sector and a
final goods producing sector. The household earns labor income by working in the final
goods producing firms. They also hold deposits and unit equity in the bank earning a risk
free rate of return and dividends. The bank tries to maximize shareholder value given that
it is owned by the household. Every period, the bank must decide on how many deposits
to accept, the volume of loans and the amount of dividend payout. Following Aiyagari and
Gertler (1999), I define dividends as the difference between net assets at the beginning of
the period minus net assets in the end of the period. The bank will also have to satisfy a
capital requirement constraint imposed by the regulatory authority. This constraint simply
states that the bank must be able to finance a certain fraction of it’s new assets with
it’s own equity. In other words, this constraint can also be interpreted as a cap on the
amount of deposits to accept. Lastly, I also impose that the dividend payments have to
be non negative. This point will be discussed at length at a later stage but for now, this
assumption is important for the capital constraint to have force. This assumption makes
sense because it can be prohibitively expensive to issue new equity especially when the
economy is experiencing a downturn.
The non financial firms sector is divided into two parts, the capital goods producers and
the final goods producers. The capital goods producers produce the investment goods and
sell it to the final goods producers who in turn use this capital and labor, from households,
to produce the final output. The capital goods producers maximize profits and are subjected
3to adjustment costs. The final goods producing firms are in need of resources to buy capital
goods and they approach the bank for loans. These firms make zero profits.
I will allow for two exogeneous shocks namely a TFP shock and a capital quality shock
following Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010). As in Gertler and Kiyotaki, I will think about this
as a shock to the quality of capital rather than a physical depriciation shock. The bank
will not realize the value of this shock till the decisions on the loans and deposits are made.
This is one of the most crucial assumptions and will be discussed in the model section. One
can also think of this as the amount of risk in the bank’s balance sheet. If unregulated,
the bank always has a tendency to take on excessive risk and that is the rationale for
capital requirements in this model. I show that higher capital requirements can reduce the
volatility in the economy. I do find a net gain in welfare as well. I also address a policy
question about how strict should the regulation be? I show that with stricter regulation,
the cost of insolvency is high and so the banks hold greater buffers and that can provide
structural stability to the financial system by reducing volatility. Lastly, I modify the
model to study countercyclical capital requirements which is one of the main tenets of the
recent macroprudential regulation proposed under Basel III. Switching from a flat capital
requirement regime to a countercyclical regime also seems to reduce volatility and raise
welfare.
This paper contributes to two strands of literature. The first one is the literature that
tries to understand whether capital requirements are a boon or a bane for the economy.
Giammarino (1993), Hellman et al. (2000) talk about the benefits of capital requirements
owing to the moral hazard problem arising from deposit insurance. Admati et al. (2010)
advocate for capital requirements much higher than what they curently are. They advocate
for capital requirements as high as 20-25 percent, as in Britain. This is much higher than
4the current FDIC regulations which is around 8 percent, for tier 1 and tier 2 capital taken
together. The question that immediately comes to mind is are there no costs of these
capital requirements and how do they affect a bank’s financial decisions? If there are no
costs, why not have 100 percent capital requirements and have all bank assets financed by
equity. Van den Heuvel (2008) talks about the welfare implications of these requirements
and shows that it can lead to a decline in welfare. The rationale there is as follows. The
capital requirements introduce a financial friction into the system by limiting the banks
ability to create assets by accepting deposit type liabilities. The household values deposits
as given deposit insurance, it is like holding an asset with a safe return. So do the benefits
outweigh the costs? Or is it the other way around? What is the net impact on welfare?
There has been no concensus reached on this entire issue. I try to explore this question in
greater detail by incorporating both the costs and benefits of capital requirements in the
same framework.
The second strand of literature that my work relates to is the one that explores how
credit constraints might have an impact on the macroeconomy. Kiyotaki and Moore (1997),
Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) and Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) are some of the
major papers in this literature, by no means an exhaustive list though. Gertler and Kiy-
otaki (2010) studies financial intermediation and it’s effect on the business cycle. However
it assumes an always binding flow of funds constraint which is necessary to derive some
intuitive analytical results. Additionally, there is no capital requirement constraint in that
model. I will try to explore macroprudential policy in this paper keeping the set up sim-
ilar to Aiyagari and Gertler (1999) and Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010). I pose the problem
a bit differently. I not only allow for an explicit capital requirement constraint but also
acknowledge that such a constraint is only occasionally binding. The difference between
5bank equity and the minimum requirements are defined as the capital buffer in the model.
The bank holds a buffer capital so that it remains compliant with the regulatory author-
ity’s requirements should there be an economic downturn. This modification will also allow
me to investigate the role of countercyclical buffers to stabilize the economy, in a modified
version of the model. There is one immediate benefit of this approach. De Wind (2008) and
Den Haan Ocaktan (2009) document that it might well be that the constraint is binding
in the steady state but not off steady state. Even in that case, the steady state results are
greatly affected. I try to circumvent this problem by allowing for capital buffers. However,
it must be acknowledged that solving such models with occasionally binding constraints
can be computationally intense. Standard perturbation methods cannot be applied. Some
people put forward a global solution but at the cost of losing tractability. I will be us-
ing the penalty function method, originally proposed by Judd (1998), to solve this model.
Intuitively, this method allows anything to be feasible but penalizes the objective in case
the constraint is violated. This method has gained quite a bit in popularity and has been
widely used in a variety of settings by Den Haan and Ocaktan (2009) and Preston and Roca
(2007) among others.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives some stylized facts about the
equity asset ratio of commercial banks in the United States. Section 3 introduces the model.
Section 4 discusses the analytical solution. Section 5 poses the numerical solution method
and the outline for solving the model, section 6 puts forward the calibration while section
7 modifies the model to study countercyclical capital requirements. Section 8 presents the
results while section 9 concludes with plan for future research. The tables and figures have
been placed in the appendix.
61.2 Stylized Facts about the Equity Asset Ratio
At the very outset, let us look at some stylized facts about the equity-asset ratios of the
commercial banks in the United States. Capital regulations along the lines of Basel Core
Banking Principles require the equity-asset ratio to be above a certain threshold called the
minimum capital requirement. To be precise, Basel I proposed a flat risk based capital
requirement of about 8%, tier 1 and tier 2 capital taken together. Basel II introduced a risk
based capital requirement which is that the banks have to hold a certain fraction of their
risk weighted assets, as capital. The risk weights could be determined by the bank’s own
risk management models. The risk weights on business loans were the highest while the
ones on Government bonds received a zero risk weight. In what follows, I will document
the movement of the equity-asset ratio over time and then demonstrate the comovement of
this ratio with some key real macroeconomic variables.
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Figure 1·1: Time plot of the Equity-Asset Ratio
Figure 1·1 shows the time plot of the equity asset ratio since 1985.2 The equity shown
2HP filtered with smoothing parameter equal to 1600
7above is the banks common equity. The data covers a hundred and four quarters from
1985:Q1 to 2010:Q4. The data come from the Consolidated Report of Condition and Income,
referred to as the Call Reports. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation requires all
regulated financial institutions to file periodic information (financial and others). These
data are maintained and published by the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.3 I plot the
equity asset ratio superimposed on the NBER recession dates. As the figure shows, we
have witnessed three recessions since 1985, the biggest one being the current one. The
equity-asset ratio exhibits a procyclical pattern as one would expect. The reason for that
is that during the recessions, the credit risk materialization is high and the amount of non
performing assets (NPA) on a banks balance sheet rises which in turn causes the equity to
shrink. If the banks are highly levered, then a small fraction of NPAs could bring about a
substantial decline in equity and lead to insolvency. We will look into this issue later in the
paper.
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Figure 1·2: Equity-Asset Ratio, Real GDP and Investment
Figure 1·2 shows the comovement of the equity asset ratio with two main real vari-
ables namely the HP filtered GDP series and the gross private domestic investment in the
3This data is available at http://www.chicagofed.org
8economy.4
The series co-moves or rather the equity-asset series seems to lead the series for output
and investment. The data start at 1985 and it must be mentioned here that the Basel capital
requirements were put into place for the first time in 1988-89. The potential cause for this
comovement is the following. A decline in the equity-asset ratio triggered a shrinkage in
the balance sheet of banks to remain compliant. The adjustment could not come from the
numerator as it is difficult to raise capital, from the market, when the economic scenario
is good. The liquidity crunch in turn meant a decline in investment and output. The data
shows that this feedback takes roughly four quarters. Figure 3.2 below shows the correlation
of the equity asset ratio with leads of investment and output gap. The correlation peaks at
around 4 quarters and then tapers off.
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Figure 1·3: Equity Asset Ratio and lead GDP/Investment
Now that we have looked at the behavior of the equity-asset ratio it will be useful to
define what we mean by capital buffers. The capital buffer is the excess of capital that a
bank holds over and above the minimum level required by the regulator, the Federal Deposit
4The data are available in the FRED database of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
9Insurance Corporation (FDIC) in the context of the United States. A pertinent question
is why would the bank want to hold buffers? The bank will not want to hold buffers as it
means forgone lending opportunities. On the other hand it might be prudent to hold buffers
as that means the bank will not have to shrink its balance sheet, in an economic downturn,
to meet the solvency requirements. What does the data say? It has been observed that the
bigger banks in the United States, tend to hold zero or minimal buffers because they have
implicit Government guarantees and better access to financial markets. The smaller banks
on the other hand tend to hold larger capital buffers.
Since many of the bigger banks were highly levered during the period preceeding the
financial crisis, a sharp decline in asset quality led to a substantial decline in the net worth
forcing many financial institutions go below the minimum capital ratio. The Government
had to intervene and bail out some financial institutions that were systemically important,
by means of recapitalization. Given that the banking sector in the United States is pretty
concentrated, it might be useful to look at the equity-asset ratio of the top four banks by
assets namely J.P Morgan, Citibank, Bank of America and Wells Fargo. Figure (3) below
shows how the capital asset ratio has evolved for these top four banks in the United States,
in the years preceeding the financial crisis. These banks roughly account for two thirds of
the market share in terms of assets and are hence a good proxy for the overall economy.
Prior to the financial crisis, these banks remained very close to the statutory minimum
requirements and even going below it sometimes.
A well capitalized bank need not engage in aggressive adjustment of asset portfolios in
an economic downturn, to maintain the minimum capital requirements. Countercyclical
10
Figure 1·4: Capital/Asset Ratio of the top 4 BHCs
buffers5 will help the banks absorb losses. This will, thus, not result in a credit squeeze
leading to a drop in overall economic activity. In the model I develop in the next section, I
allow for endogeneous buffers and try to explore this issue a bit more.
1.3 The Model
The model builds on the model by Aiyagari and Gertler (1999) and also incorporates some
features of Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010). The main point of difference is that I allow for an
occasionally binding capital constraint (countercyclical buffers) and try to approximate the
solution by a penalty function method. I depart from the Modigliani-Miller framework by
introducing a capital requirement constraint. These two features can be easily incorporated
without significant costs in that the framework still remains tractable and yields some
5A simple way to compute the capital buffer is the following:
CB =
T ier1 + T ier2
RWA
− 0.08
where CB stands for capital buffer and RWA stands for risk weighted assets. In other words, it is the excess
of tier 1 and tier 2 capital held by the bank over and above the regulatory 8% requirement. Tier 1 capital
is the core measure of a bank’s financial strength from a regulator’s point of view. It primarily consists of
common stock and retained earnings. It may also include non-redeemable non-cumulative preferred stock.
Tier 2 capital represents supplementary capital such as undisclosed reserves, general loan-loss reserves and
subordinated debt.
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interesting results.
1.3.1 The Physical Environment
There are a continuum of non financial firms of mass unity. The non financial firms produce
the final output of the economy by employing labor and capital as inputs. The production
function takes the standard Cobb Douglas form which is:
Yt = AtK
α
t L
1−α
t , (1.1)
where At is the total factor productivity (TFP henceforth) and is governed by a Markov
process and 0 < α < 1.
These firms producing the final output will hire labor from the households and buy
capital goods from the capital goods producing firms. To buy these investment goods, the
firm will have to approach the bank for loans. The price at which these loans are obtained
and the price of capital goods is same and that means these firms earn zero profits. Denoting
It as the aggregate investment and δ as the constant rate of depriciation, the law of motion
for aggregate capital stock is given as:
Kt+1 = [It + (1− δ)Kt)]θt, (1.2)
where the interpretation of θ is as follows. Following Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010), I
define θ as a capital quality shock. This is different from physical depriciation, which is
captured by δ. The reference of the capital quality shock can be found in Merton (1973) and
is a simple way of introducing an exogeneous source of variation in the value of equity. The
aggregate output of the economy is divided into household consumption, Ct, and investment,
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It. The resource constraint in this model is written as:
Yt = ct + c(
It
Kt
)It, (1.3)
where the adjustment cost function exhibits constant returns to scale and will be discussed
in detail in the section on calibration. I now introduce the other agents of the model namely
the household that consumes, holds deposits and supplies labor, the representative bank
that intermediates funds between the households and the manufacturing goods firms and
also the non financial firms sector comprising the capital goods producers and the final
goods producers.
Household 
The Bank 
Final Good 
Producers 
Capital Good 
Producers 
Deposits (d) Dividend 
(D) 
Labor (l) 
  Capital goods (k) 
Loans (s) 
 Wage 
   (w) 
  Return   
on loans 
Price (Q) 
Figure 1·5: Flowchart of agents
Figure 1·5 above shows the flow of resources across the economy as has been explained
in the preceeding paragraphs.
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1.3.2 The Household
In this model, I have a representative household that lends to non financial firms via the
bank. The household does not hold capital directly but they put their deposits in the bank.
They however own labor in exchange for which they earn wage income. They also own
equity in the bank for which the bank pays dividends. The objective of the household will
be to maximize its utility. The deposits that the household puts in the bank earn a one
period risk free rate of return. The household preferences are given by:
U(ct, dt, lt) =
[
ac1−bt + (1− a)d1−bt
] 1−φ
1−b
1− φ − χ
l1−ϕt
1− ϕ (1.4)
where (0 < a < 1), is the share parameter, b, ϕ, φ, χ > 0 and b, ϕ, φ 6= 1, χ is the parameter
measuring the disutility from supplying labor, ϕ is the Frisch elasticity of labor supply
and 1/b is the constant elasticity of substitution between consumption and deposits. As
b approaches zero, consumption and deposits become perfect substitutes. I abstract from
many of the frictions in conventional DSGE modelling like habit formation of consumption,
variable capital utilization and nominal wage and price rigidities. I however deviate from
the Modigliani-Miller setup by having bank capital requirements, to be discussed shortly.
Let Wt denote the wage rate, dt denote the deposits made this period, Rt the gross
return on riskfree deposits and Dt the dividends received from the bank. This is justified
given that the household owns the bank. The household budget constraint is then written
as:
ct + dt = Wtlt +Dt +Rtdt−1 (1.5)
The left hand side shows the household expenditures every period. It consumes and
sells deposits to the bank. The right hand side shows the total receipts that the household
14
earns. It consists of labor income, dividends and earnings from one period riskless deposits.
The household maximizes the expected discounted utility subject to the budget constraint
to yield the the optimality conditions as follows:
u′l(ct, dt, lt)
u′c(ct, dt, lt)
= Wt (1.6)
u′d(ct, dt, lt) + βu
′
c(ct+1, dt+1, lt+1)Rt+1 = u
′
c(ct, dt, lt) (1.7)
where,
u′c(ct, dt, lt) =
[
ac1−bt + (1− a)d1−bt
] b−φ
1−b
ac−bt ,
u′l(ct, dt, lt) = χl
−ϕ
t
u′d(ct, dt, lt) =
[
ac1−bt + (1− a)d1−bt
] b−φ
1−b
(1− a)d−bt
Equation (7) differs from the standard Euler equation in that we now have our house-
holds derive utility from holding deposits. The right hand side shows the loss in utility by
putting one unit more in deposits while the left hand shows the gain in utility from holding
a unit deposit this period and the next periods gain in utility from consumption. Equation
(6) is the standard equation governing the labor-leisure choice.
1.3.3 The Bank
The primary role of the bank in this model is to intermediate funds between the household
and the non financial firms. This may be justified on the grounds that it minimizes transac-
tion costs. The only way the firms can finance their investment is by taking loans from the
bank. To finance these loans, the bank has to raise deposits from households and pay them
a deposit interest rate. However, the bank has an additional capital requirement constraint
to satisfy which stated in simple terms just says that the bank has to finance a certain
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fraction of it’s risky assets (loans in this model) by the bank equity. Stated differently, this
imposes a cap on the amount of deposits that can be raised. This hinders the bank from
engaging in excessive risk taking and aggressive lending.
In this model, the bank will try to maximize the present discounted value of current and
all future dividends while satisfying the flow of funds constraint, the capital requirement
constraint and the non negative dividend constraint, to be introduced shortly. At the
beginning of every period, the aggregate state is realized but not the financial shock. The
bank has to decide on its volume of loans, deposits and dividend payout before this shock is
realized and this assumption is of paramount importance as will become clear shortly. This
risk of non compliance with the authority’s requirements motivates prudential regulation
in the model. The financial friction in this model is the equity regulatory constraint. And
because of the timing issue briefly mentioned above, the bank will have an incentive to hold
buffers and not remain close to the minimum stipulated level. If the bank maintains a capital
that is close to the minimum requirements, then in the event of an economic downturn when
credit risk materialization is high and loan recovery rates are low, the capital declines and
there is a high probability that the bank might find itself non compliant with the regulations.
Further, it is extremely difficult to raise fresh equity from the market during downturns. If
the decline in this equity-asset ratio is sharp enough, it could also result in the loss of the
entire charter value. To prevent that, the bank will have to cut back on lending in an effort
to boost the equity-asset ratio. And this credit squeeze can further exacerbate the problem,
something that we saw during the recent financial crisis.
In the context of the United States, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation requires
all regulated financial institutions to provide some details (financial and others) every year.
It monitors whether the financial institutions are sound enough and one of the main indica-
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tors of financial soundness is the capital position of the bank. In FDIC parlance banks with
more than 10 percent equity as a fraction of risk weighted assets are called well capitalized,
those having 8-10 percent are called adequately capitalized, below 8 percent are undercap-
italized, below 6 percent are significantly undercapitalized and those below 2 percent are
critically undercapitalized.
If a bank falls below the 8 percent level, the FDIC first declares it as undercapitalized,
if it is below 6 percent, then it can bring about a change in management and if the distress
persists and the bank capital falls below 2 percent, the bank can be declared as insolvent and
taken over. However, the bank will try to avoid being declared as undercapitalized because
of loss in franchise value and losing it’s customer base. In my solution methodology, I adopt
a penalty function approach where the amount of penalty imposed is proportional to the
shortfall in capital and that is motivated by the FDIC penalty structure just described. I
do not claim to replicate the realistic penalty imposed but my approximation certainly has
elements of the idea. In what follows, I present the bank’s optimization problem and try
to provide an intuitive analytical explanation of the occasionally binding capital constraint
before presenting the simulation results.
The bank maximizes the present discounted value of current and future dividends:
Vt = Et
∞∑
i=0
Λt+iDt+i (1.8)
The dividends are defined as the difference between net assets at the beginning of the period
and the end of the period. It is written as follows:
Dt = [(Zt + (1− δ)Qt)θtst−1 −Rtdt−1]− (Qtst − dt) (1.9)
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The first parenthesis shows the net assets (total receipts less payments due) at the
beginning of the period while the second parenthesis shows the net assets at the end of the
period. Zt is the gross return on capital and can also be thought of as the dividend payment
at t on the loans the bank had made in t− 1. Qt is the price of capital (loans in this case)
and st−1 is the amount of loans made last period. As has been mentioned earlier, Rt is the
riskless deposit rate. It must also be noted that the gross payoff from the asset depends
on the capital quality shock, θt. The last equation can also be thought of as balance sheet
constraint. Rearranging the terms we get:
Qtst − dt = [(Zt + (1− δ)Qt)θtst−1 −Rtdt−1]−Dt
This equation simply states that the assets minus liablities have to equal the bank capital
(net worth) net of dividends. Unlike Gertler and Kiyotaki, I abstract from interbank market
in this framework. In addition to the flow of funds constraint above, the bank also has to
satisfy a capital requirement constraint or a margin constraint which can be written as
follows:
[(Zt + (1− δ)Qt)θtst−1 −Rtdt−1]−Dt − κQtst > 0 (1.10)
The most simple interpretation of this constraint is that the bank must finance a certain
fraction (κ) of assets with it’s own resources. In other words, after the bank receives the
payoff from assets net of deposit costs and pays out dividends, it must be left with sufficient
funds to finance a fraction, κ, of the new loans it makes in that period.
It may be helpful to look at equations (9) and (10) together. Substituting out dividends
in (10) yields:
(1− κ)Qtst > dt
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This is just setting a bound on the amount of deposits that the bank can accept. More
precisely, the bank can, at most, finance (1 − κ) fraction of it’s new loans with deposits.
The remaining will have to be financed by the bank’s own resources.
Lastly, we need one more condition for the capital constraint to have force. If it were easy
to issue fresh equity instantaneously and costlessly, then the bank would have no incentive
to manage it’s capital in a prudent manner because the market will always stand ready to
bail it out. This assumption of not being able to raise fresh equity is intuitive. When the
economic scenario looks grim, it is not possible to raise resources from the market. I will
not make any attempt to model other institutional or commitment factors that might lead
banks to use leverage rather than new equity issuance. In terms of the model, the following
constraint is tantamount to saying that the bank cannot issue new equity. The only way to
raise capital is by retained earnings.
Dt > 0 (1.11)
We refer to the last constraint as the dividend constraint. I claim that if the capital
requirement constraint is binding, the dividend constraint has to bind. To see that this
is intuitive, let us consider the counterfactual. What would have happened if the capital
constraint was binding but not the dividend constraint? In such a scenario, the bank could
easily reduce the dividend payments and once again satisfy the capital constraint. So it
is imperative that when the equity constraint is binding, dividend payments have been
reduced to zero.
An important question to ask is why would the bank want to hold this excess equity
in the first place? In other words, what is the role of capital in the model? This question
is nested in a bigger question which asks what is the role of capital in general? To answer
19
this question we have to understand the bank’s problem a little more. The key timing issue
is that when the bank makes choices of loans, deposits and dividends, the capital quality
shock is not realized yet. In terms of the real world, when a bank takes a decision on its loan
portfolio, it does not know how many of those loans are going to default in the next period.
If a lot of assets go bad, the bank equity can get wiped out quickly leading to insolvency.
The bank will want to hold a buffer capital to prevent this from happening. In terms of the
model, at the end of every period when the shock is realized, the total return from loans is
known. Given the banks choice of dividends, it should also have enough resources to satisfy
the regulatory constraint. If this is not the case, then the bank will have to face some
unfavorable consequences. The bank will want to avoid such unfavorable consequences.
1.3.4 Capital Goods Producers
These firms produce the investment good by using the final output and are subjected to
adjustment costs.6. They sell these goods to the final goods producing firms who need
this capital and labor to produce their output. They choose investment by maximizing the
following objective function:
maxEt
∞∑
τ=0
Λt,τ [QτIτ − c(Iτ/Kτ )Iτ ] (1.12)
where,
c(It/Kt) = (
b1
1−a1 (
It
Kt
)1−a1 + c1)
6The adjustment cost is a concave and increasing function that satisfies c(δ)=δ and c’(δ)=1 The only
parameter that is of importance here is the curvature of this function or how sensitive is the investment-
capital ratio to the price of capital (a1). The value of this parameter is taken from the extensive literature
on Q theory. Christiano and Fischer (1998), Jermann (1998), Boldrin et. al (2001) and Uhlig (2004) use a
value of 0.23 for this parameter. The other two parameters are chosen to make the steady state independent
of a1.
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Profit maximization yields the following optimality condition.
Qt = c1 +
a1b1
1− a1 (
It
Kt
)1−a1 (1.13)
1.3.5 Final Goods Producers
As mentioned earlier, these firms play a crucial role in the model because they are the ones
who demand loans from the bank to purchase investment goods. Put differently, these firms
issue securities to the bank and this security price will respond sharply to changes in the
bank’s net worth position thereby affecting investment a great deal. These firms operate a
CRS technology and use labor and capital goods as the inputs for their production process.
The production function is standard Cobb Douglas. The wage rate and the gross return
are given as follows:
Wt = (1− α)Yt
Lt
(1.14)
Zt =
Yt −WtLt
Kt
= αAt(
Lt
Kt
)1−α (1.15)
α is the share of output going to capital. These goods producers earn zero profits.
Exploiting perfect competition, the price of loans and price of investment goods are identical
in this set up.
1.3.6 Market Clearing
We now close the model by listing the various market clearing conditions. There are four
markets in the model described namely, the goods market, the labor market, the securities
market and the deposit market.
The final output is used for consumption and investment and so the goods market
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clearing condition or the resource constraint once again is:
Yt = Ct + c(
It
Kt
)It (1.16)
The security market clearing comes in next. Following Gertler and Kiyotaki, the total
amount of securities issued/supplied must be equal to the aggregate capital accumulated
and hence the condition is:
st = (It + (1− δ)Kt) (1.17)
The labor market clearing condition requires that:
χLϕt
C−σt
=
(1− α)Yt
Lt
(1.18)
The deposit market clears by Walras law.
1.3.7 Timing
At the beginning of the period, the aggregate state of the economy i.e the TFP shock is
realized. The bank shock or the capital quality shock is realized at the end of the current
period. In other words, when the bank is making lending decisions it knows At but not θt.
Next the capital quality shock is known and so is the bank’s net income which is receipts
from assets less deposit costs. If this is positive, the bank pays dividends and proceeds
to the next period. If this is not the case, the regulator will set dividends equal to zero
and prevent the bank from engaging in valuable lending. Note that if the net income is
negative, the capital constraint is violated as well and this is precisely the role of capital
in this model. If the bank does not hold a capital buffer, then it will be prevented from
indulging in profit making opportunities in the event of a large unfavorable shock.
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1.4 Analytical Results
In this section I present some analytical results and provide an intuitive explanation of
the accasionally binding equity constraint. I present different cases when the constraint is
binding or is likely to bind at some point in the future and explain the implications for the
real sector. The bank will choose loans, deposits and dividends to maximize the present
discounted value of dividends subject to the flow of funds, equity and dividend constraints.
The first order conditions for the problem as given below.
Et[Λt,t+1γt+1R
e
t+1] + (1− κ)µt = γt (1.19)
Et[Λt,t+1γt+1Rt+1] = γt − µt (1.20)
Ωt + µt = γt, γt > 1, (1.21)
In the last equation, γ = 1 if Dt > 0. Also the return on loans is given as:
Ret+1 = θt+1
(1− δ)Qt+1 + Zt+1
Qt
Ω and µ are the multipliers on the flow of funds and margin constraints respectively. The
following cases are possible:
Case 1: µt = 0: This is the case when the equity constraint is not binding in the current
period. The Euler equation assumes the standard form and the risk free rate is the inverse
of the expectation of the stochastic discount factor. As mentioned earlier, if the margin
constraint binds at time, t, or at any t + i, the dividend constraint must bind at time t.
The intuition is straightforward. If the bank is very close to the minimum requirements
and there is a possibility of violating the constraint, then the bank must reduce dividends
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to zero and accumulate the retained earnings. If Dt > 0, then the Bank can easily reduce
D and remain compliant with the regulations! The point is that in this case, we are in the
standard asset pricing world. The bank accepts deposits and makes loans while remaining
compliant with the regulations. The financial friction is not relevant in this case. However,
as we will see in the following cases, this is not always the case. Let us explore a bit further.
Case 2: µt > 0: The dividend on loans can be written as:
EtR
e
t+1 =
γt−(1−κ)µt−cov(Λt,t+1γt+1,Ret+1)
E(Λt,t+1γt+1)
And, given the equation for risk free rate, I derive the expression for excess returns as:
EtR
e
t+1 −Rt+1 =
κµt − cov(Λt,t+1γt+1, Ret+1)
E(Λt,t+1γt+1)
(1.22)
In this case, the equity constraint is binding in the current period. The asset pricing
formulae will differ from the frictionless case. The risk premia is above the fundamental
level which corresponds to the last case. When the capital constraint binds and the bank
is not able to issue fresh equity instantaneously, it will have to reduce its holding of risk
weighted assets to meet the requirement. In terms of the model, the bank is holding these
securities issued by the final goods producers. When the bank is forced to unload some of
it’s assets at a discount, it drives down asset prices and leads to a decline in investment and
economic activity. This amplifies the economic downturn. An alternative and a different
way of looking at the similar situation would be as follows. When the constraint binds, the
bank will have to cut back on the amount of loans it finances and hence the final goods
producers will not be able to purchase enough of investment goods and hence output and
consumption would decline. Let us now turn to the final case.
Case 3: µt+i > 0 for some i > 1: A similar mechanism will operate here. The covariance
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between γt+1 and R
e
t+1 is negative and so if there is some chance that the constraint will
bind in the future, then that could lead to a higher risk premium on assets currently. This
in turn will lead to the complications discussed in the last case and bring about a slump in
economic activity. We thus find that this theory is indeed very powerful. It does not really
matter whether the bank is insolvent today or is likely to be insolvent in the near future.
The implications for the real sector can be equally severe under both circumstances. The
reason for the covariance being negative is the following. If γt+1 is positive, that means the
equity constraint is binding at t+ 1. As discussed earlier, that will force the asset price at
t+ 1 to be below it’s fundamental level and hence the return on loans will be lower in t+ 1.
1.5 Numerical Solution: The Penalty Function Method
In models with occasionally binding constraints, the standard perturbation methods cannot
be employed as the policy function is non differentiable in the vicinity of the steady state.
Some people may put forward a global solution by value function iteration methods but
due to the curse of dimensionality, this may not be feasible if the state space is rich. I use
the penalty function approach, originally proposed by Luenberger (1973) and Judd (1998).
This approach has also been used by Preston and Roca (2007), Kim, Kollman and Kim
(2009), Den Haan and Ocaktan (2009) and more recently by Abo Zaid (2012).7
The idea is simple. We allow anything to be feasible but let the objective function have
some unfavorable consequences if the constraint is violated. More precisely, the penalty
7More examples are Christiano and Fischer (2000), Mendoza (2010) and Brunnermeier and Sannikov
(2011). Preston and Roca (2007) use an interior function to ensure satisfaction of intertemporal budget
constraints and hence in their framework, this interior function (penalty) approaches infinity as the capital
holdings of agents approaches the borrowing limit. Kim, Kollman and Kim (2009) use a similar method
to solve a heterogeneous agent model with aggregate uncertainty. They show that the model does pretty
well to minimize Euler equation errors provided the capital at the beginning of the period is large enough.
Den Haan and Ocaktan also use this methodology to solve a heterogeneous agent model. Abo Zaid (2010)
applies this method to solve a model with the zero lower bound.
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imposed is zero when the constraint is not violated and goes to infinity as the constraint
binds tightly. Thus this model nests the original model. By doing this, we convert the
original model with inequality constraints into one that has only equality constraints. Now
we can apply standard perturbation methods to solve this model. There are a few penalty
functions in the literature but I use the one presented in De Wind (2008). The primary
reason for choosing this penalty function is that the function is asymmetric and generates
a skewed response to shocks as we observe in the data. The table 1.1 below shows the
skewness of some of the most important macroeconomic variables and the performance of
the model with this asymmetric penalty function.
Table 1.1: Skewness (Model Vs Data)
Investment Output Cap. Buffer
Data -0.8462 -0.0054 -0.4782
Model -0.7448 -0.0029 -0.5011
Always binding constraints and symmetric penalty functions do not generate such a
model behavior. Further, penalty parameter in this specification can be altered easily to
change the curvature and without affecting the model properties. The form of the penalty
function is as follows:
P = ψ−2exp[ψ(κQtst +Dt − (Zt + (1− δ)Qt)θtst−1 +Rtdt−1)]
The term within the parenthesis is the capital buffer. If this term is negative, it means that
the bank is compliant with the regulatory requirements and there is no penalty. However,
once this term becomes negative, there are some unfavorable consequences. The objective
function of the bank is modified as follows:
Vt = Et
∑∞
i=0 Λt+i[Dt+i − dt+i−1ψ2 exp[ ψdt+i−1 (κQt+ist+i +Dt+i
−(Zt+i + (1− δ)Qt+i)θt+ist+i−1 +Rt+idt+i−1)]]
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where the penalty function is normalized by the state variable to preserve the constant
returns structure.
Once we incorporate the penalty function in the objective function, there is no need
to write the capital requirement constraint separately while solving the problem. The
parameter ψ governs the curvature of the penalty function and will be a key parameter in
the analysis below.
On solving the above modified objective function subject to the budget constraint for
the bank, we get expressions similar to the ones we obtained earlier and they are as follows:
Et[Λt,t+1(λt+1 + Ωt+1)R
e
t+1] + (1− κ)λt = λt + Ωt
Et[Λt,t+1(λt+1 + Ωt+1)Rt+1] = Ωt
Ret+1 = θt+1
Zt+1+(1−δ)Qt+1
Qt
λt + Ωt = 1
and, λt =
1
ψexp[
ψ
dt−1 (κQtst +Dt − (Zt + (1− δ)Qt)θtst−1 + (Rtdt−1)]
λ is the punishment term in terms of the model terminology. In other words, it is the shadow
valuation of violating the constraint. It is also the derivative of the penalty function with
respect to the capital buffer.
Some important issues need to be discussed regarding the incorporation of a non linear
punishment function. De Wind (2008) and Den Haan and Ocaktan (2009) have extensive
discussion on these issues. The main point is as follows. The penalty function is highly non
linear and so we might be tempted to put in a lot of curvature by choosing a high value of
ψ. However, typically we are restricted to lower order perturbations and so putting in a lot
of curvature might not be the best idea. In this paper, the model is solved using a third
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order approximation and so the problem is tackled here. The penalty function is highly non
linear and I perturb at a sufficiently higher order. The choice of the order of approximation
was also straightforward. A first order approximation is immediately ruled out given the
non linearity of the penalty function. The third order is chosen to capture the asymmetric
nature of the problem. In other words, the bank is not penalized for holding excess capital
but only when it falls short of the minimum requirements. The standard deviation of the
shocks are expected to affect all the terms in the policy function and not just the constant.8
Figure 1·6 demonstrates the class of penalty functions as the amount of curvature is
changed. On the horizontal axis, I plot the level of buffers from negative five percent
(equivalent to bank holding three percent capital) to positive two percent (equivalent to
bank holding ten percent capital). On the verical axis, I plot the penalty imposed for
different levels of curvature, as a function of buffers. For ψ = 130, we get the most severe
penalty while the reverse is true for ψ = 50. An important issue here is as follows. We can
see that the greater the curvature the closer is penalty model to the original model. In my
simulations, I work with a reasonably penalty i.e ψ = 130, which is permissible as the order
of approximation is high in this particular case.
Ideally we want the constraint to be non binding in the vicinity of the steady state and
so we want the penalty function to be flat in this region (slope should be small near the
steady state). However, a flat penalty function means that the steady state is farther away
from the steep part of the function and in that case, given the magnitude of the shocks, we
might not get the desired asymmetry. I chose the value of ψ keeping these issues in mind
8Recently user friendly softwares like Dynare and Dynare++ have made it possible to perturb at any
order. I do not adopt higher orders as in those cases, the impulse response functions tend to be noisy owing
to the presence of high degree polynomials. That problem can be taken care of by the method of pruning
but the results have been unsatisfactory thus far. However, these issues will not be discussed in any more
detail, in this paper. In the following figure, I plot the penalty functions for varying levels of curvature.
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Figure 1·6: The Penalty Function for different levels of curvature
and also to match the skewness of some key macroeconomic variables in the data as has
been documented earlier.
1.6 Calibration
I now discuss how the model was calibrated and in the next section I present some results of
the numerical solution. Table 1.2 in the appendix lists the values of the parameters. Most
of the parameters are standard. The discount factor, β, was chosen to get an annualized
risk free return of four percent. The value of κ is set at eight percent which is in line with
the Basel I requirements that the banks should hold eight percent of tier 1 and tier 2 capital
as a fraction of it’s risk weighted assets. Depriciation is set to be ten percent annually. The
disutility of labor was calibrated to get a steady state labor supply of 0.3. Labor supply
elasticity is set at two.
The two shocks in the model are the total factor productivity shock and the capital
quality shock. They follow independent Markov processes as follows:
lnAt = (1− ρA)lnA+ ρAlnAt−1 + ut
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lnθt = (1− ρθ)lnθ + ρθlnθt−1 + vt
The TFP shock has more persistence and less volatility than the financial shock. The
AR(1) coefficient and the standard deviation of this shock is in line with the standard
business cycle literature being 0.9 and 0.01 respectively. Estimates of Solow residuals yield
a highly persistent AR(1) process in levels. The standard deviation replicates US postwar
quarterly output growth volatility. The calibration of the financial shock follows Gertler and
Karadi (2011). I think of this shock as a rare event but conditional on occurence, it follows
an AR(1) process. The persistence of this shock is 0.75 and it has a standard deviation of
5 percent. The target is to get a ten percent decline in effective capital stock over eight
quarters, investment remaining roughly same. Next we turn to the parameters of the utility
function. Following standard business cycle literature, the inverse of the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution, φ, is set equal to 2. The values of the share parameter, a, and
the elasticity of substitution between consumption and deposits, b, are chosen to yield a
deposit to consumption ratio of 0.7, a number that is consistent with the US data9.
1.7 The Countercyclical Capital Requirement Regime
Capital regulations provide structural stability to the financial system which in turn makes
the economy more resilient to adverse shocks. However, the question that arises is what form
of prudential regulation is the best one? The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision has
laid out a set of core principles popularly referred to as Basel I, II & III. Without going into
the minute details, Basel I required that banks hold a certain fraction of their risk weighted
assets as capital. Basel II was basically a shift to a risk based capital regime where banks
had to hold a certain fraction of their risk weighted assets as capital and the risk weights
9Van Den Heuvel (2008) and Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan have a discussion on this issue
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were calculated by banks, based on their internal risk management systems. The debate
that immediately cropped up is whether this transition generates extra procylicality. This
issue has been explored by many researchers and the evidence is mixed. But having said
that, in the aftermath of the financial crisis, a concensus has emerged that there is need to
amend the Basel II guidelines. This has paved the way for the discussion on macroprudential
regulation. In this section, I will modify the model to study the implications of such a policy.
Without proceeding further to explore the other forms of prudential regulation in the
context of the model, a discussion of the procyclicality issue is required. As has been
mentioned earlier, some researchers have found evidence of capital requirements being pro-
cyclical. This is all the more true if the requirements are too low. In the event of an
economic downturn, the credit risk materialization is high and loan recovery rates are low.
In such a situation, the bank capital declines, sometimes to the extent that the bank finds
it difficult to remain solvent. The adjustment in the capital asset ratio could come from
the numerator or the denominator. But, since in times of financial distress, it is difficult
to raise capital from the market, banks will fire sell assets to boost the capital asset ratio.
This brings about a credit crunch and exacerbates the already existing problem. In other
words, the capital requirement reinforces the business cycle. Transitioning to the Basel II
regime has certain implications for procyclicality as well. The reason for that is risk in itself
is cyclical in quantity and value. In economic downturns, the risk is higher (Borio et al.
2001). Also the price of risk is low in booms and high in busts (Lowe 2002). I now consider
how the model can be used to analyze countercyclical capital requirements as it is known
to control the procyclicality problem.
In this section, the problem is modified so that the capital requirement is time varying
and countercyclical in nature. Essentially, we allow κ to vary with time and this is governed
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by the following equations. The capital requirement constraint can be written as:
[(Zt + (1− δ)Qt)θtst−1 −Rtdt−1]−Dt − κtQtst > 0
where κ evolves as follows,
κt = (1− ρκ)κ+ (1− ρκ)Λκ(logYt − logYt−1) + ρκκt−1 (1.23)
If Λκ is positive, this means that the capital requirements are countercyclical. In good times,
the banks will have to hold more capital and these requirements decrease in downturns. This
should help us mitigate the procyclicality problem. The reason is that during a financial
crisis, the capital requirements get lowered and so the bank does not have to embark on
aggressive selling of assets and this spares the economy of the credit squeeze that we have
observed.
More precisely, I perform two thought experiments and try to simulate the path of the
economy in response to an adverse shock. The benchmark is the model with flat capital
requirements with κ = 0.08. I consider a mildly countercyclical policy and an aggressive
countercyclical policy. The first regime corresponds to a decline in capital requirements
from 8 percent to 7.5 percent over six quarters after the financial shock. The second
regime corresponds to the more aggressive countercyclical capital requirement regime with
κ declining from 8 percent to 6 percent over six quarters. Λκ = 10.5 corresponds to the first
case while Λκ = 41.8 corresponds to the latter.
1.8 Results
In this section, I discuss the results of the numerical solution. The tables are in appendix
1 while the figures can be found in appendix 2.
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1.8.1 Exploring the Asymmetry in the Model
As mentioned previously, the penalty structure in the model is asymmetric and non linear.
It might be helpful to look at the differential behaviour of the model in response to an equal
magnitude positive and negative unit financial shock. The results are presented in figure
1.8.2 Changing the Capital Requirement
Figure 1·8 plots the impulse response10, of the key variables in the model, to a financial
shock. The model was solved for three different levels of capital requirements i.e. eight,
ten and fourteen percent. We observe a dampening in the amplification produced when the
economy is hit by this adverse shock. Higher capital requirements means that banks have
more resources to absorb shocks. The banks with lower capital are the ones that are highly
levered and the impact of an economic downturn, on these banks, is much greater than
their well capitalized counterparts. This is of paramount importance and this point needs
to be stressed. In the period preceeding the financial crisis, many financial institutions
had leverage ratios between twenty and thirty. That meant that only a three and a half
percent loss in assets would be enough to wipe out the entire bank equity. It is for this
reason that higher capital requirements should be implemented. On the lines of Basel Core
Banking Principles, there are other pillars to improve the financial health like quality of
capital and liquidity requirements but that is beyond the scope of this paper. Here we focus
only on capital requirements. Coming back to figure 1·8, as capital requirements increase,
the bank does not have to adjust as much, to the shock, and so the economy witnesses a
much subdued response. The benchmark case here is the one with eight percent capital
10The paper presents impulse responses that are non linear. As in the case of non-linear IRFs, the starting
point matters. For this analysis, I start from the steady state for all the plots.
33
requirements. The steady state excess returns is about a hundred and thirty basis points.11
The financial shock leads to a fall in the bank net worth and a sharp rise in the excess
returns. The bank has to adjust by reducing it’s asset holdings. This leads to a decline in
asset prices and investment. The output and consumption also decline accordingly. The
fall in asset prices has a second round effect on the bank capital as well. This is the key
mechanism that operates in the model. It must be noted however, that when the bank is
well capitalized, this mechanism is weakened becuase the impact of a shock on the balance
sheet is proportional to how levered the bank is.
1.8.3 Altering the Penalty Parameter
An interesting question to ask is how do the impulse response of the key variables in the
model look as we alter the amount of punishment imposed in case the capital requirement
constraint is violated. The value of the punishment parameter, ψ, controls the curvature of
the penalty function and the penalty term λ. More precisely, it shows how severely the bank
is punished once it violates the capital requirement constraint. In figure 1·9, I construct
the impulse responses for two levels of the penalty term (λ) - a high and a low one. This
is done by altering the value of ψ. If we look at the impulse response for the key variables,
namely consumption, investment, capital and output, we find the shock is amplified a great
deal with a higher value of ψ. The red line corresponds to the value of ψ = 160. The blue
line represents a higher penalty corresponding to a value of ψ = 130. Note that the higher
value of ψ though ad hoc, is not of much importance. We are trying to gain some intuition
on a bigger policy question here. What this figure really shows that it might be a good
11The average spread between mortgage rates versus government bond rates, BAA corporate bond rates
versus government bonds and commercial paper rates vs T-Bill rates, in the pre 2007 period, was around a
hundred basis points, Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010).
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idea to impose a more stringent penalty if the bank fails to meet the capital requirements.
If that is the case, the bank will try to maintain a capital buffer so that it does not have
to shrink it’s balance sheet in a downturn to remain compliant with the regulations. The
current FDIC penalties are such that the bank is declared critically undercapitalized only
when the capital is 2 percent of risk weighted assets. That might be a bit too low and there
is need to reformulate that structure, as it seems.
1.8.4 Time Varying Capital Requirements
Figure 1·10 plots the evolution of some key macro variables under three different capital
requirement regimes. The red line is the model with flat capital requirements, the blue
line is the model with mildly countercyclical capital requirements while the black solid
line is the model with strongly countercyclical capital requirements.12 Clearly the models
with time varying requirements generate less volatility than the benchmark model with flat
requirements. The intuition is straightforward. If the banks do not have to meet higher
capital standards during a downturn, they will not have to adjust rapidly. This can help
mitigate the credit squeeze problem. The banking sector will continue lending and financing
investment. After the financial crisis, a concensus has emerged that there is need to shift to
such macroprudential policies. My model makes a similar policy recommendation. The last
row of table 1.4 shows that by introducing time varying capital requirements, the correlation
between the bank capital and output is also reduced to a great extent suggesting a solution
for the procyclicality problem.
12Please refer the section on Countercyclical Capital Requirements for a discussion of each of these regimes.
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1.8.5 Welfare Implications
Lastly, let us address the question about welfare implications of capital requirements in the
model. It has been mentioned in the literature that introduction of capital requirements
might lead to a loss in welfare because it constrains the ability of banks to make loans by
creating deposit type liabilities. This is true but there is no conclusive evidence on how
severe this decline is. There might also be net gains from imposing such requirements as they
provide stability to the financial system and forward looking individuals will incorporate
this gain in their decision making. I compute the welfare under different levels of capital
requirement and also under the countercyclical capital requirement regime. The objective
is the households utility function which can be written recursively as follows:
Wt = U(ct, dt, lt) + βEtWt+1 (1.24)
I report the welfare results in tables 3 and 5 in the appendix. Table 3 shows some steady
state numbers of consumption and welfare under the flat capital requirement regime. The
thought experiment here is as follows. I simulated the model for three different levels of
capital requirement, namely eight, ten and fourteen percent. I ask the question, what is the
welfare gain/loss from operating at 8% instead of say, 14%? Can we do better by shifting
to a regime with higher κ? To report the welfare in consumption terms, I compute what
amount of adjustment in consumption (∆C) would generate the same steady state welfare
as the hypothetical benchmark case which is the case with κ = 0.14. It is observed that
there is a decline in consumption and welfare. In other words, there can be net gains from
implementing higher capital requirements. Higher capital requirements reduce use of retail
funding but also prevent insolvency which casts a negative externality on the household
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sector by choking off dividends. The benefits here are outweighing the costs.
How do the welfare figures look like if we transition to a world with countercyclical
capital requirements? The results are presented in table 5. We can see that the welfare is
higher under the countercylical scheme than under the fixed capital requirements. In fact
the strongly countercyclical regime generates a gain which is equivalent to about 1.11%
of consumption. The intuition for these results is the following. During the downturn,
the capital requirements are reduced and so the bank does not have to adjust as much
to remain solvent. This prevents the credit squeeze and the overall decline in economic
activity. The households being forward looking will anticipate this benefit. This is basically
the justification for implementing macroprudential policies and the model supports this line
of reasoning.
1.9 Conclusion
This paper builds a framework where the benefits and costs of capital requirements can be
analyzed. It presents a set up to analyze macroprudential policy in a world of occasionally
binding capital constraints. I show that higher capital requirements can actually help banks
absorb shocks better. It is also shown that if the banks hold buffers, they will not need to
sell assets, at a discount, in a downturn to remain compliant with the regulations but just
reduce their buffers to absorb shocks. Moreover, stringent regulations might be necessary
for banks to hold excess capital as holding capital can be costly. The model has some
nice welfare results as well. Effect on welfare is a strong point of criticism against higher
capital requirements. Based on my analysis, I propose that we might be operating in a
suboptimal world with very low regulatory requirements. I show that this is indeed the
case in my model. The model can also be easily modified to analyze countercyclical capital
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requirements. Countercyclical buffers do make the economy resilient to downturns and in
terms of welfare, the society is much better off under such regulations than the current set
of policies.
In future work, the question I want to explore, is about the quality of capital. We can
have capital requirements as high as twenty percent but is that number enough? What if
the capital is not of sufficiently high quality? The other question that I am intererested in
exploring concerns the optimal timing issue in countercylical capital requirement regime.
If capital requirements are raised too quickly in booms, we might hamper growth while if
they reduced too rapidly in downturns, bank defaults become more likely. So what should
be ideal window while implementing such prudential regulations? I believe more work on
these lines is required especially at this time when macroprudential regulations are being
gradually put in place.
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1.10 Appendix: Tables
Table 1.2: Calibration
Parameter Symbol Value
Discount Rate β 0.99
Capital Requirement κ 0.08
TFP shock persistence ρA 0.90
Volatility of TFP shock σu 0.01
Depreciation δ 0.025
Penalty parameter ψ 130
Share of Capital α 0.33
Risk Aversion σ 1.5
Mean of TFP A 1.00
Disutility of labor χ 10.36
Inverse of Frisch Elasticity of labor supply ϕ 0.5
Utility fn. share parameter a 0.95
Intratemporal el. of Substitution 1/b 0.39
Persistence of Financial shock ρθ 0.75
Volatility of Financial shock σθ 0.05
Adjustment Cost Parameter a1 0.23
Table 1.3: Steady State Results
Variable κ = 0.14 κ = 0.10 κ = 0.08
Consumption 0.4603 0.4600 0.4559
Welfare 20.29 19.98 19.32
Welfare Decline (in cons. terms) – 0.35 % 0.43 %
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Table 1.4: Business Cycle Statistics
Output Consumption Cap-buffer Investment
Standard Deviations
Data 0.0115 0.0056 0.0093 0.0419
Model 0.0188 0.0058 0.0099 0.0320
Model (cc κ) 0.01001 0.00529 0.00954 0.02801
First Order Autocorrelations
Data 0.88 0.83 0.93 0.87
Model 0.96 0.89 0.99 0.92
Correlations with Output
Data 1.00 0.88 0.96 0.91
Model 1.00 0.92 0.91 0.96
Model (cc κ) 1.00 0.79 0.64 0.94
Table 1.5: Welfare Results
Variable Flat κ cc κ Strongly cc κ
Welfare 19.32 20.07 21.78
Welfare Gain (in cons. terms) −− 0.76% 1.11%
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1.11 Appendix: Figures
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Figure 1·7: Asymmetric Response to a unit Financial Shock
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Figure 1·8: Altering the Capital Requirement
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Figure 1·9: Altering the Penalty Parameter
0 5 10 15 20
−1
0
1
2
3
4
5
x 10−3
time
la
m
bd
a
 
 
flat κ
cc κ
strongly cc κ
0 5 10 15 20
−0.012
−0.01
−0.008
−0.006
−0.004
−0.002
0
time
in
ve
st
m
en
t
0 5 10 15 20
−12
−10
−8
−6
−4
−2
0
2
x 10−3
time
a
ss
e
t p
ric
e
0 5 10 15 20
−0.012
−0.01
−0.008
−0.006
−0.004
−0.002
0
time
ca
pi
ta
l
0 5 10 15 20
−7
−6
−5
−4
−3
−2
−1
0
x 10−3
time
o
u
tp
ut
0 5 10 15 20
−2.5
−2
−1.5
−1
−0.5
0
x 10−3
time
co
n
su
m
pt
io
n
Figure 1·10: Flat vs countercyclical capital requirements
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Chapter 2
Bank Capital and Lending: An
Analysis of Commercial Banks in
the United States
2.1 Introduction
The banking sector is one of the most regulated ones today and bank capital regulation is of
utmost importance. The commercial banks in the United States face capital requirements
based on the the Basel Core Banking Principles. In December last year, the government
announced that the Basel III guidelines will be fully implemented soon. The banks in the
United States have to hold about eight percent capital (Tier 1 and Tier 2)1 as a fraction of
it’s risk weighted assets. They do not default at eight percent but are declared undercapital-
ized. The regulatory authority, which is the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation in the
context of the USA, takes over the bank only if the bank capital is less than two percent of
the risk weighted assets in which case the bank is said to be critically undercapitalized. The
cost of defaulting or even being undercapitalized could be substantial. It could lead to the
1Tier 1 capital is the core measure of a bank’s financial strength from a regulator’s point of view.
It primarily consists of common stock and retained earnings. It may also include non-redeemable non-
cumulative preferred stock. Tier 2 capital represents supplementary capital such as undisclosed reserves,
general loan-loss reserves and subordinated debt.
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bank’s franchise being revoked in the worst case scenario. Obviously, the bank would take
steps to ensure such a state never occurs. Hence they take decisions on how much capital
to hold and this choice is indeed a difficult one for reasons that will be discussed later in
the paper. Banks do not have complete control over their regulatory capital asset ratios
simply because the returns on the risk weighted assets are stochastic. In an unfavourable
state, the bank may well find itself below the minimum capital requirements even though
it maintained the eight percent level. Thus the banks hold buffers to absorb such negative
shocks. In a bad state of nature, this buffer will act as a cushion and prevent the capital
ratio going below the minimum stipulated ratio.
In the aftermath of the financial crisis, there has been some work that tries to explore
the linkages between financial and real sectors. The effect of changes in bank capital on
lending decisions is the primary determinant of the linkage between financial conditions
and real activity. This paper takes a step towards quantifying this important relationship.
During the financial crisis, when the likelihood of a credit crunch was still under debate, the
relation between bank capital and bank lending was a key policy concern. Likewise, when
the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) moved to inject capital into banks through
the Capital Purchase Program (CPP), the impact of the program on real activity largely
focused on the effect of these injections on bank lending. More recently, this question has
re-emerged in light of proposals announced by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
to raise banks’ capital requirements and limit leverage ratios2.
There are not many recent estimates for the U.S of the impact of changes in bank
capital on lending. In the aftermath of the 1990-91 recession, many observers debated
whether the newly introduced capital regulations along the Basel guidelines were hindering
2See Berropside and Edge (2010)
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lending. Although this debate did not yield a concensus, it did result in the development
of empirical models that sought to quantify the effect of bank capital on bank lending. For
example, Hancock and Wilcox (1993, 1994) estimated models relating changes in individual
banks’ loan growth to measures of loan demand and bank capital. Similarly, Berger and
Udell (1994) specified an equation relating the growth rate of various bank assets to different
measures of bank capital ratios. Finally, Bernanke and Lown (1991) developed state-level
equations linking bank loan growth to bank capital ratios and employment, for a single
state (New Jersey).
In this study, we mainly ask one question. We ask how the bank capital affects the
lending decisions of banks. Our sample only includes commercial banks. The data comes
from the Call Reports database, maintained by the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. We
conduct the analysis only for the lower three quantiles by total assets and this point will be
made clearer when we explain the endogeneity issues and identification strategy. Our results
appear more in line with the results obtained by Berropside and Edge and the estimates we
obtain are substantially smaller than suggested in statements by US treasury officials post
the financial crisis. The reasoning that Berropside and Edge have in their paper, reconciling
the two sets of results, applies to our case as well and so for the benefit of the reader, we
put forward the justification here.
The statements from the US Treasury suggest that a $1 increase in bank capital leads to
a $8 - $10 increase in lending capacity. These magnitudes are reasonable once we make the
assumption that banks actively manage their assets to maintain a constant leverage. This
view is based on a scetterplot from Adrian and Shin (2007). We reproduce this figure below.
The sample period used in figure 2·1 is 1963 to 2006, the same as that employed by Adrian
and Shin. The constant leverage ratio is apparent from the scatterplot. This suggests a
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Figure 2·1: Asset and Leverage Growth (1963-2006)
very active management of assets by commercial banks. This implies that a change in bank
capital has a magnified effect with the scaling factor equal to the leverage ratio.
Now, how do we compare our regression results with the Adrian-Shin scatterplots?
We must acknowledge the major structural change that took place in the banking sector
following the introduction of the Basel Banking Accord, in 1989. Our sample starts from
1996 while Adrian and Shin sample start from 1963.3 To find out what effect this choice of
sample period has on the analysis, consider the figure 2·2 below, from Berropside and Edge
(2010).
The left panel shows relation between asset and leverage growth prior to Basel (1963:Q1-
1989:Q4) and this is consistent with the Adrian and Shin assumption. The interesting part
is the right panel which plots data post Basel i.e 1990:Q1-2008:Q3. As can be seen from
comparing these plots, the feature of the data that has led to the view that commercial
banks actively manage their assets to maintain constant leverage is much more of an artifact
3Berropside and Edge start from early 90s as well, i.e after the introduction of the Basel Accord.
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Figure 2·2: Asset and Leverage Growth (Pre & Post Basel)
of the early part of the sample and is considerably less evident in the latter part. Indeed,
in the latter part of the sample, there is no obvious correlation between asset and levearge
growth.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 surveys the literature, section 3
describes the dataset we use, section 4 explains the empirical model, variables and method-
olgy, section 5 presents the estimation results and section 6 concludes. The graphs and
tables are placed in the appendix.
2.2 Related Literature
The impact of bank capital on lending is one of the key questions that arises when we want
to explore macro-financial linkages. It is hence surprising that there are not many recent
estimates for the United States of the impact of changes in bank capital on lending. In
the aftermath of the 1990-91 recession, Hancock and Wilcox (1993, 1994) estimated models
relating changes in individual banks’ loan growth to measures of loan demand and bank
capital. The methodolgy developed in Hancock and Wilcox (1993) could be problematic
and a bit difficult to interpret for the following reason. They measure response of lending
to excess/shortfall of capital from a target ratio. The issue here is that this equation
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could be misspecified. If the target is poorly specified, then the excess/shortfall is also
poorly specified. Berger and Udell (1994) specified an equation relating the growth rate
of various bank assets to different measures of bank capital ratios. Finally, Bernanke and
Lown (1991) developed state-level equations linking bank loan growth to bank capital ratios
and employment, for a single state (New Jersey).
If we look beyond the United States, there are some studies that seek to quantify this
relationship between bank equity and credit extension. Peek and Rosengren (1997), Puri,
Rocholl and Steffen (2010) use loan applications from German Landesbanks to examine
the effect of shocks to capital on the supply of credit by comparing the performance of
affected and unaffected banks. Gianetti and Simonov (2010) use Japanese data to perform
a similar exercise concerning bank bailouts. These papers do find a relevant role for capital
in determining loan volumes, although they do not explicitly compare the magnitudes of the
effects they find with those implied by the constant leverage view. Another group of papers
use firm and bank loan-level data; these include Jimenez, Ongena, and Peydro (2010), who
use Spanish data, and Albertazzi and Marchetti (2010), who use data on Italy. These papers
find sizeable effects of low bank capitalization and scarce liquidity on credit supply.
The papers using Spanish and Italian data find a larger value for the impact of capital
on loans. Santos and Winton (2010), using US loan level data (syndicated loans), obtain
relatively small effects of bank capital on lending. Also, Elliot (2010) uses simulation based
techniques to find small effects of capital ratios on loan pricing and loan volumes for U.S.
banks. De Nicolo and Lucchetta (2010) use aggregate data for the G-7 countries and
conclude that credit demand shocks are the main drivers of bank lending cycles. Our
magnitudes of this effect are modest and appear consistent with other papers that employ
U.S. data.
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2.3 Data and Stylized Facts
For this analysis we prepared an unbalanced panel of commercial banks balance sheet data.
Our data covers sixty quarters from 1996:Q1 to 2010:Q4. The data is obtained from the
Consolidated Report of Condition and Income, referred to as the Call Reports. The Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation requires all regulated financial institutions to file periodic
information. These data are maintained and published by the Federal Reserve Bank of
Chicago.4
The appendix provides a detailed documentation of the data. Regulatory capital re-
quirements have undergone a few changes ever since their inception in the late 1980s. In
1985-1986, banks had to hold a primary capital exceeding 5.5% of assets. By the end of
the decade, this rose to 7%. Effective December 31, 1990, the banks were required to hold
a total capital of 7.25% as a fraction of risk weighted assets with the Tier 1 capital being
at least 3.25%. These ratios further got hiked to 8% and 4% following the implementation
of Basel I in the end of 1992. Then on, these ratios have remained fairly stable. In our
sample, we do not encounter such sudden changes.
Table 2.1 in the appendix gives the summary statistics of the data. We have 343,752
observations covering around nine thousand commercial banks in the United States. We
ignore the top and bottom deciles. To elaborate, we rank the banks by average size (mea-
sured by log of total assets) over the sample period and then drop the top decile and bottom
deciles. The rationale for this stems from our instrumenting strategy. Our main instrument
for the capital ratio is the interaction between land price changes and the real estate lending
of a particular bank. We think that it is only the relatively smaller/medium sized banks
4Historic data from 1976 to 2010 is available at the Chicago Federal Reserve website. Beginning with
the March 31, 2011, call reports are only available from the FFIEC Central Data Repository’s Public Data
Distribution site (PDD)
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that are more sensitive to local land price movements. The bigger banks are much more
diversified across states and hence we leave them out for the sake of this analysis. The
bottom decile is droppped as these are extremely small in terms of total assets and have
limited or no access to capital markets. These banks are the ones that report extrtemely
high capital asset ratios and hence we treat them as outliers for our analysis. We only
include banks that have a capital adequacy ratio less than or equal to 25%. We also drop
the banks if we find that the loan growth rate exceeds 50% in a particular quarter. This is
indicative of a merger and hence we do not include these banks in this study.
As the table shows, we collected data on three different measures of capital, namely the
capital adequacy ratio (CAR), the tier 1 capital ratio (Tier 1 Capital) and the common
equity to asset ratio (ETA) but in this chapter, the results reported will only be for the first
two as these two are the regulatory ratios which is what we are interested in. The medium
sized banks in the United States appear to be well capitalized by all measures. They are
well above the Basel 8% minimum capital requirements and that is a positive point to note
from the table.
We work with a host of loan to asset ratios in this paper as our data is not merger
adjusted and so if we had looked at loan growth rates per se, that would not be a satisfactory
analysis. The loan data we gather comprises loans made to the real estate sector, commercial
and industrial loans, agricultural loans and loans to households. LTANR shows the loan
to assets ratio where we leave out real estate loans and include the other three categories.
LTAR is the loans made to the real estate sector normalized by total assets. The mean
real estate lending as a fraction of total assets is about 47% which is quite substantial.
This justifies our instrument all the more. The banks are sufficiently exposed to the real
estate sector and hence their bank capital will be a lot more sensitive to real estate price
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movements.
The other variables we have are the growth in the house price index (g−HPI). It shows
that on average the real estate prices have risen by about 7.4%, in the sample period. This
data was collected from the FRED database.
We now look at some stylized facts in the data. It is useful to look at some of the key
variables, in our analysis, for the US at four different points in time, within our sample.
Figure 3 shows the distribution of the loan to asset ratios of banks in our sample. Figures
4-6 show how the distribution of bank capital has changed over time. It clearly shows that
towards the end of the sample there are many more banks who operate at low levels of
capital. The fourth panel represents this all the more being after the financial crisis during
which the balance sheets of most banks shrunk leading to a loss in equity. The mass to
the left of the 10% capital level has increased irrespective of the measure of capital we use.
Figures 7 and 8 show the time series of these variables. The grey bands show the NBER
recession dates. This helps us understand the behavior of these variables over time. It is
clear how the house prices and the bank capital fell dramatically during the recent financial
crisis. We show all three measures of bank capital as discussed earlier.
2.4 The Empirical Framework
The empirical model we wish to estimate is the following:
Log(LTANRsi,t) = αi + νs + βKi,t + γ1BSCi,t−1 + γ2Macrot−1 + ui,t (2.1)
Where,
• Log(LTANRsi,t) is the logarithm of the loan to asset ratio of bank i at time t, with
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headquarters located in state s. Here the loans are all the loans made by the bank
except the real estate loans. To elaborate on this point a little more, the loans included
in this variable are the industrial/commercial loans, loans to individuals and the loans
to agriculture. The only other major lending sector is the real estate sector which is
not included in LTA, the reason for which will be outlined below. It is evident that
the change in the dependent variable is the growth rate of the loan to asset ratio.
• K is a measure of bank capital. We will be working with two different measures of
capital. First, we use the capital adequacy ratio which is the Tier 1+ Tier 2 capital
as a fraction of risk weighted assets. Second, we use the Tier 1 ratio as a robustness
check.
• BSC consists of lagged bank specific controls which include loan chargeoffs as a mea-
sure of risk in the balance sheet and total securities normalized by total assets as a
measure of liquidity in the banks balance sheet.
• Macro controls for the state of the overall macroeconomy i.e. aggregate shocks. We
use the growth rate of real GDP as the control.
• αi and νs are the bank and state fixed effects respectively.
2.4.1 Endogeneity Issues and IV Estimation
We are aware that the equation above suffers from a potential endogeneity problem. In
practice, the banks decide on it’s lending strategy and retained earning decision simultane-
ously. In other words, the equation above assumes that the bank sequentially decides on
how much capital to hold and then how many loans to make. In practice, however, this
might not be a reasonable assumption. We think that such decisions are not sequential but
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simultaneous. Hence we find a suitable instrument for bank capital. Our instument is the
banks exposure to the real estate sector. Our first stage regression is the following:
Ki,t = α+ θLTAR
s
i,t−1 ∗%∆LPt + controlsi,t−1 + vi,t (2.2)
Here,
• LTAR is the average loans made to the real estate sector over total assets in the last
three quarters. It measures the exposure of a bank to this particular sector. The
greater the exposure, the greater will the bank capital be sensitive to real estate price
movements.
• LP is the real estate price index at the state level
• controlsi,t−1 includes bank specific and macro controls as discussed earlier.
Here we instrument bank capital by the interaction between the change in real estate
prices and real estate exposure of the bank. If the real estate prices in a particular state
increase, then the impact on bank capital depends on the banks exposure to the real estate
sector. If a bank has sufficient exposure to the real estate market, a rise in land price means
that the value of its assets have risen and that in turn means that the bank now has greater
equity. On the other hand, if the bank has limited exposure to the real estate sector, this
rise in land prices will have a much subdued impact on its capital. We report the regression
results later to prove the validity of the instrument but it is clear that our instrument is
correlated with the bank capital and uncorrelated with the error because our dependent
variable is the loans made to all sectors except the real estate sector. This is not correlated
with land price movements or loans made to real estate in the last three quarters.
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2.5 Regression Analysis
Table 2 shows the first results for the impact of bank capital on lending. This is the
baseline specification and we add controls sequentially here. Columns (1)-(4) use the capital
adequacy ratio as the measure of capital while columns (5)-(8) use the tier 1 capital ratio.
Columns (1) and (5) include no additional controls in the regression. The magnitude of β
is significant at the 1% level. We see that on introducing controls, the coefficient remains
significant at the 1% level.5 The baseline results show a subdued impact of bank capital on
lending. A 1% point increase in the CAR leads to an increase in the growth rate of banks
loan to asset ratio in the range of 54bps and 96bps. We now look into other specifications
of the model and also study different measures of capital to assess the robustness of our
estimates.
Table 2.3 shows the results of our main IV estimation. The dependent variable is still
the growth rate of loan to asset ratio where the loans exclude those made to real estate
sector. The first two columns show results from our entire sample which is all commercial
banks except the top and bottom decile. The next two columns show results from banks
above the median and the last two columns show results for banks which are below the
median. We also use the two measures of capital for each of the three samples. We include
state fixed effects in the regression to capture within state changes. We also include lagged
macroeconomic and bank specific controls. However, before we discuss the results listed
in this table, perhaps we should briefly comment on the first stage regression which is the
direct estimation of equation (2). The results are shown in table 2.4. We use the percentage
change in real estate prices times the three quarter average of real estate loan to asset ratio
5We use lagged liquidity and chargeoffs as bank specific controls and lagged GDP growth as the macro
control variable.
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as the instrument. The first and second columns predict the CAR and the tier 1 capital
respectively. The next two columns are for the bigger banks while the last two are the
smaller banks. The sign on the instrument is positive which means that with a rise in asset
values, the bank capital increases, assuming that liabilities are roughly constant.
Now let us look at table 2.3 in detail. The coefficient on the capital ratio remains
positive and significant at the 1% confidence level across all specifications. We find a
moderate response of lending to bank capital. As discussed earlier, the magnitudes are
much smaller when compared to Adrian and Shin (2007) but are in agreement with other
papers that use US data and where the sample period starts after the introduction of the
Basel Banking Accord in 1989. The other thing to note is that the effect of capital on
lending is bigger for the relatively bigger banks as shown by columns (4)-(6). The reason
could be as follows. The bigger a bank gets and the more capital it has, it can give out more
loans that a smaller bank. Bigger banks tend to enjoy greater acccess to financial markets
and government guarantees than smaller banks. Hence their LTA growth rate responds
more to capital than their smaller counterparts. For the whole sample, we find that a 1%
increase in capital leads to an increase in the growth rate of LTA which ranges between
0.54% and 0.96% depending on what measure of capital we use. For the sample above the
median this effect ranges between 1.00% to 2.8% while for the smaller banks, the range is
between 0.30% and 0.46%. Berropside and Edge do not consider separate studies for the
different groups of banks as we do but using bank holding company data, their estimates
are quite close to ours.
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2.6 Conclusion
This paper seeks to quantify the impact of bank capital on lending as this is one of the
key policy questions while analyzing financial-real sector linkages. Using a subset of the
commercial banks in the United States and an innovative instrumenting strategy, we find
a modest impact of bank equity on lending behavior. Our estimates are consistent with
other recent studies in the literature that have worked on US data. Some earlier papers
do report much higher estimates but they do not account for the structural change in the
banking sector following the introduction of the Basel Core Banking Principles. We find
that a 1% increase in capital leads to an increase in the growth rate of LTA which ranges
between 0.54% and 0.96% depending on what measure of capital we use. For the bigger
banks this effect ranges between 1.00% to 2.8% while for the smaller banks, the range is
between 0.30% and 0.46%.
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Chapter 3
Financial Depth in the WAEMU:
Benchmarking Against Frontier
SSA Economies
3.1 Introduction
The importance of financial depth for broad-based economic growth is widely recognized.
The empirical literature has demonstrated that countries with higher levels of financial
sector depth tend to grow faster.1 Financial depth, which measures access of private sector
to credit, has been particularly challenging to improve in sub-Saharan Africa. Deeper
financial systems with wider access to credit help promote and support entrepreneurship and
social mobility and thus are vital for broad-based economic growth. Therefore, identifying
factors that promote financial deepining, and explains differences in financial depth across
countries on that dimension, warrants closer examination.
In Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), financial depth has been uneven across regions and re-
mains a critical policy challenge despite progress over the past two decades. The focus of
1See Levine and Zervos (1998) and Khan and Senhadji (2000).
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this paper is to examine where the West African Economic and Monetary Union2(WAEMU)
stands relative to some selected economies in the SSA and which factors may help explain
this performance. The benchmark group is comprised of some frontier SSA countries, the
High Growth Non-Oil Exporters (HGNOEs).3 The novelty of this paper is that: i) it focuses
on a group of African countries with shared monetary and financial policies, and compares it
to a group of high performing countries in SSA, and; ii) it uses two complementary empirical
approaches to compare the two groups of countries: first, a regression analysis to identify
the factors that explain the difference in financial depth between the WAEMU and the
control group, and second, a case study to benchmark the biggest and most financially ad-
vanced economy in the WAEMU (Cote dIvoire) against a comparable country in the control
group (Mozambique). The case study is based on the financial benchmarking methodology
developed by the World Bank (Beck et. al., 2010; Feyen and Kibuuka, 2012). Our analysis
is based on a panel of 16 countries (eight countries from the WAEMU, and eight HGNOEs)
over the period 19972009. Over that time period, FSAPs (the IMFs Financial System As-
sessment Program) were performed on both Cte dIvoire and Mozambique, which helps us
account for the structural reforms underlying the difference in financial deepening between
the two countries. Moreover, the period is sufficiently long to capture the lagged impact
of policy reforms on improving the financial environement. The results are consistent with
the literature: we show that stronger rule of law, infrastructure, and credit information
collection and dissemination have a strong impact on financial sector depth.
2The WAEMU countries are Benin, Burkina Faso, Cte dIvoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and
Togo. The eight countries are all members of the CFAF currency zone.
3The High Growth Non-Oil Exporters (HGNOEs) are the countries with an average per capita growth
rate of at least 3 percent during 19952009. Eight frontier SSA countries fall into this category: Botswana,
Cape Verde, Ethiopia, Mauritius, Mozambique, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda. (cf. IMF, African Regional
Economic Outlook, October, 2010).
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3.2 Stylized Facts and Empirical Literature Review
Basic indicators of financial depth show that the WAEMU is lagging relative to the control
group. The figure below depict the development of credit to the private sector and broad
money in terms of GDP. In the WAEMU, the ratio of private sector credit to GDP increased
marginally from 12 percent to 17 percent between 19972009, while it accelerated from 17
percent to 37 percent of GDP in the control group, as is seen in the left panel of figure
3·1. The ratio of broad money to GDP, a measure of the degree of monetization, followed
a similar profile. Broad money relative to GDP grew from 31 percent to 52 percent in the
benchmark countries, while rising from 20 percent to 29 percent in the WAEMU over the
period, as shown in the right panel of figure 3·1, below.4
Figure 3·1: Private Sector Credit to GDP Ratio
The banking system in the WAEMU is not only shallower compared to the benchmark
countries, but it is also less profitable. Return on assets, weighted by bank assets, remained
constant around 1.3 percent in the WAEMU, half of the level in HGNOEs, as is evident
from figure 3·2. The contrast is also striking for return on equity. In explaining the dif-
ferences in financial depth across countries, the empirical literature distinguishes between
4Source: Bankscope
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Figure 3·2: Return on Assets and Equity
structural factors and policy factors.5 Structural factors are country-specific characteris-
tics that cannot be altered by policies in the short run. These include the overall level of
economic development and other characteristics such as population size and density, age
dependency. The overall level of development, measured by per capita income, can effect
financial depth through elevating demand for financial services and higher supply of savings.
Countries with larger populations and higher population density can have deeper financial
penetration and lower cost of financial intermediation from economies of scale. The share
of non-working young and old populations (age dependency) affects savings and lending
patterns. Policy factors are those that may impact the banking environment including
macroeconomic policies (such as inflation, fiscal balance, and debt), institutional policies
(regulatory and supervisory framework, accounting and disclosures practices, credit infor-
mation and contract enforcement), and other financial sector reforms that may liberalize
credit markets or enhance market compeititon.
There is evidence in the literature that both structural factors and macroeconomic poli-
cies can have an impact on financial deepening. Levine (2003) and Claessens and Feijen
5Demirguc-Kunt (2006) provides a comprehensive survey of the explanatory variables used in the analysis.
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(2006) show the importance of overall economic development, measured by per capita in-
come. On macroecnomic policies, Detragiache et al. (2005) find a negative impact of
inflation on financial depth, while Boyd and al. (2001) highlight the non-linear relationship
between inflation and financial development.
Looking beyond macroeconomic performance, there is also evidence that contarct en-
forcement, credit infrastructure, and market liberalization play an important role. Using
bank-level cross sectional data, Demetriades and Fielding (2011) investigate the determi-
nants of individual banks’ loans in the WAEMU. Their results suggest that banks are reluc-
tant to lend because the infrastructure to screen and monitor borrowers is not developed.
Governance in all its aspects (government effectiveness, control of corruption, and rule of
law) also plays a role. Detragiache, Gupta and Tressel (2005) find that contract enforce-
ment and property rights matter in financial development. Sacerdoti (2005) explains the
low ratio of credit to private sector to GDP by a deficiency in the supporting institutional
framework. Ghura, Kpodar, and Singh (2009) explain low financial depth in the CFA franc
zone countries through the weaker legal, contractual, and institutional environment in the
region compared to SSA. Using the financial liberalization index constructed by McDonald
and Schumacher (2007) that captures some aspects of financial reforms (credit controls,
interest rate controls, informal financial sector), Ghura, Kpodar, and Singh (2009) find that
this aggregate index is related to greater depth in financial development.
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3.3 The Regression Analysis
In this section, we analyze the difference between financial depth in the WAEMU and in the
comparator group, after controlling for other relevant factors. In our empirical analysis, the
measure of financial sector development is credit to the private sector as a share of GDP. The
analysis is based on a panel of 16 countries over the period 1997-2009 at annual frequency.
The panel analysis allows us to track the WAEMU countries over a relatively long time
horizon and compare them with other peer economies. We use macroeconomic data from
the IMF International Financial Statistics, and indicators on institutions, political stability,
and credit infrastructure from the World Bank. We estimate credit to the private sector as
a share of GDP using the following model:
Sc,t = α1 +
∑
j
βjX
j
c,t +
∑
m
βmY
m
c,t + dt + νi,t (3.1)
Where the vector Xc,t contains macroeconomic variables specific to country ‘c’ at time ‘t’.
Yc,t contains country-specific institutional and policy variables. dt is a vector of dummy
variables that takes a value 1 if the country belongs to the WAEMU region and zero oth-
erwise.
The macroeconomic indicators include the log of GDP per capita and the log of inflation.
Per capita GDP measures the overall level of economic development and is expected to
positively affect credit to the private sector. As income rises, demand for financial services
increases and that might lead to better penetration. Also with higher income, there might be
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greater savings, which means the banks will have more resources to lend from. Low inflation
is considered as a sign of macroeconomic stability, which promotes financial intermediation.
Thus the expected coefficient sign for inflation is negative.
Policy and institutional variables include indices on rule of law, political stability, credit
coverage, internet coverage among adults, and the quality of contract enforcement. The
rule of law represents a measure of the extent to which banks have faith in contract en-
forcement, police, and courts, and the likelihood of crime and violence. A strong rule of law
is expected to create an environment conducive to bank lending. Property rights captures
the dimension of rule of law related to the strength of collateral entitlements and enforce-
ment, which helps banks extend collateralized credit. Political stability, measured here by
the perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown
by unconstitutional or violent means (Worldwide Governance Indicators) is another factor
that we consider in explaining financial penetration. When the political environment is
stable, there is less uncertainty, and banks are more willing to lend. The quality of contract
enforcement, measured by the number of days required to enforce a contract, is also an
important determinant of bank lending. The greater the number of days needed to enforce
a contract, the costlier is borrowers default for bank, and thus the smaller is the amount of
credit they disburse. Credit coverage captures the quality of credit information. Credible
credit bureaus encourage the expansion of credit as they enable on the one hand lenders to
better screen borrowers, assess and manage risks, and on the other hand borrowers to gain
access to finance. Internet coverage is used as a proxy for infrastructure development, which
reduces the cost of bank penetration and helps improve bank geographical coverage. A good
internet coverage indicates a solid telecommunication infrastructure, which is critical bank
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transactions and transfers.
Tables 3.1 and 3.2, respectively, show some descriptive statistics and correlations. Credit
to the private sector relative to GDP is most correlated with infrastructure, rule of law, and
GDP per capita. Various measures of the quality of legal environment (rule of law, property
rights and political stability) are highly correlated with each other, suggesting that they
may be measuring similar attributes of the credit environment.
To further the analysis, we used a two-step Feasible Generalized Least Squares (FGLS)
to estimate the model above.6 The estimation approach allows us not only to address issues
of heteroscedasticity, but also to estimate the impact of time-invariant variables such as the
WAEMU dummy, while controlling for country-specific effects. Several model specifications
have been estimated and the results are presented in Table 3.4.
The WAEMU dummy is negative and significant even after controlling for macroeco-
nomic variables (column 1), thereby providing evidence that financial deepening is indeed
weaker in the WAEMU than in high growth non-oil exporting countries in Sub-Saharan
Africa. The sign and significance of the WAEMU variable are, however, not stable when
policy and institutional factors are accounted for.
As expected, macroeconomic variables are important determinants of credit to the pri-
vate sector relative to GDP. The impact of inflation is negative and significant in most
specification of the model. Per capita GDP is positively associated with the financial depth
in all specifications.
Looking at institutional/policy variables, we find that political stability, availability of
6The first step estimates an OLS and collects the residuals; the second step estimates generalized least
squares with a variance matrix build from the residuals collected in the first step.
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information on borrowers, strength of legal framework, and quality of infrastructure are
associated with deeper financial markets (columns 2-6). The introduction of some of these
variables substantially weakens the control variable for WAEMU countries, suggesting that
they may explain away most of the differences in financial depth between the WAEMU and
HGNOEs.
Both rule of law and property rights capture the quality of the legal environment and
are highly correlated (Table 3.2). They both are significantly associated with financial
depth (columns 2 and 6). However, the introduction of rule of law in the regression weak-
ens the WAEMU control variable, which becomes insignificant. In other words, once rule
of law is accounted for, the difference between the WAEMU group and the HGNOEs be-
comes statistically insignificant.7 This result is in line with the literature that finds that a
stronger legal framework promotes financial development as depositors can provide longer
term savings and banks can extend more credit as they have a greater chance at recovering
non-performing assets through courts.
The results also indicate that political stability matters for financial depth (column 3).
In a politically stable environment, banks have more confidence to lend because there is
less uncertainty and a greater chance of recovering their outlays. While political stability
matters, it does not explain away the differences between the WAEMU and the HGNOEs,
as the WAEMU control variable remain significant.
Quality of infrastructure, as measured by internet coverage, positively affects finan-
cial depth (column 4). It also explains away the difference in financial depth between the
WAEMU and HGNOEs. Better infrastructure allows financial institutions to reach borrow-
7The introduction of property rights slightly weakens the WAEMU dummy, which remains significant.
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ers at a lower cost, thereby encouraging more lending.
Information on borrowers as measured by credit coverage is another important factor
that is positively associated with financial depth (column 5).8 The introduction of credit
coverage in the regression also explains away the difference between the WAEMU and
HGNOEs. If banks have more information on their customers, they will screen them better
and will engage in greater lending as they will be less exposed to defaults. Small and
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and other entrepreneurs with good quality projects and
good track-record will have access to credit and be able to undertake profitable investment
projects.
Overall, the results show that the difference in financial depth between the WAEMU
and HGNOEs is explained by the quality of the legal environment, infrastructure, and
information available on borrowers. When rule of law, property rights and political stability
are simultaneously introduced in the model, only rule of law is significant (column 7),
indicating that there is some overlap in the dimension of the institutional environment
measured by these variables.
3.4 Case Study
After documenting that the WAEMU region fares poorly when pitted against some other
peer countries of the SSA region and identifying some of the key variables contributing to
the underdevelopment, we further deepen the empirical analysis by exploring where Cote
8The result of this regression should be interpreted with care, as the sample size drops substantially due
to limited data on credit coverage. Also, for this reason, we do not further explore the impact of credit
coverage on credit to the private sector in the presence of other explanatory variables.
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d’Ivoire9 stands relative to its potential, and in relation to Mozambique-a country which
appears to be the most structurally similar to Cote d’Ivoire.10 While Mozambique does
not have the most developed financial sector in the control group, it shares many key
structural similarities with Cote d’Ivoire such as population and dependency ratios. In that
sense, financial sector differences between Cote d’Ivoire and Mozambique can be largely
attributed to differences in policy. Table 5 compares Cote d’Ivoire and Mozambique with
respect to several structural characteristics used in the financial benchmarking literature. To
benchmark Cote d’Ivoire against Mozambique, we first use FinStat and then we document
policy asymmetries that might explain the difference between the two countries.
3.4.1 Where Cote d’Ivoire Stands Relative to Mozambique and to its
Potential?
Figure 3·3 shows that for much of this period, Cote d’Ivoire and Mozambique were almost
on par in terms of financial depth with private sector credit to GDP at around 15 percent for
each in 2007. But Mozambique started outperforming Cote d’Ivoire thereafter. Comparison
with the expected 75th percentile provides additional insights as it shows that Cote d’Ivoire
systematically underperformed relative to its potential over the period. The deviation of
Cote d’Ivoire’s private credit levels from its statistical benchmark and in relation with
Mozambique suggests that there is possible policy and institutional gaps in the country.
The next section aims to identify factors explaining why Cote d’Ivoire is lagging relative to
9Financial infrastructure and activities were not much affected by the internal crisis of the last decade.
In particular, the south of Cote d’Ivoire, the financial and economic center of the country accounting for the
bulk of GDP was under the government’s control during the socio-political crisis of 2002-2007. However, in
the absence of crisis the financial sector might have developed faster.
10Based on GDP per capita and population, Feyen and Kibuuka (FinStats, 2012) find that Mozambique
is the most structurally similar to Cte d’Ivoire among the control group of countries.
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Mozambique and to its potential.11
Figure 3·3: Financial Deepening in Cote d’Ivoire
3.5 Explaining the Financial Depth Gap
We referred to the Financial System and Stability Assessment Reports and the World
Bank’s Doing Business reports to explain the weak performance of Cote d’Ivoire relative to
Mozambique and to its potential. We observe differences between Mozambique and Cote
d’Ivoire during the covered period in terms of strength of contract enforcement and credit
information, two essential factors in expanding credit availability.
Mozambique’s government took forceful actions in strengthening contract enforcement,
with the establishment of a specialized commercial court, the increase by 10 percent of
the number of new judges, and the introduction of performance measure. As a result,
the time taken to resolve a commercial dispute fell by 72 percent. Doing Business 2008
11We also looked at where the other WAEMU countries stand relative their potential. We found that,
except Senegal, all the other countries perform below their potential. The graphs are displayed in the
appendix. These countries belong to the same monetary union, and they share the same monetary policy
and a common regulator of the financial sector. As such, the financial sector development issues in these
countries are similar to those we detail below for Cote d’Ivoire.
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cited Mozambique as the top performer in contract enforcement in Africa. Second, a new
legal framework for credit registries has been enacted in Mozambique, which resulted in
expanding the scope and accessibility of credit information. According to World Bank’s
Doing Business 2009, the depth of the credit information index improved from 3 to 4, out
of a possible 6.
Finally, several other reforms undertaken by Mozambique’s authorities over this period
helped increase the flow of credit (FSAP, 2009). These include: (i) transitioning from an
overall-compliance supervisory regime to risk-based supervision, which improved Bank of
Mozambique’s adaptability to risks and its monitoring of a broader range of vulnerabilities,
while forcing supervisors to closely inspect bank balance sheets; (ii) enhancing the financial
infrastructure by significantly improving the national payments system, (iii) a new legisla-
tion on microfinance, and (iv) limiting the dollarization of loans by raising the provisioning
requirement on foreign exchange loans to non-exporters. The increased financial depth
in the case of Mozambique was just one of several positive outcomes of the broad reform
agenda. Other gains include:
• A massive restructuring and clean up of bank balance sheets, which reduced non-
performing loans (NPLs) from 17 percent of gross loans in 2003 to 2.8 percent in
September 2008
• An increase in banks’ outreach with a rise in the number of branches and ATM
machines, particularly in rural and semi-urban areas. Credit however remained heavily
concentrated with limited credit for small and medium-sized enterprises and non-
salaried individuals
76
• A sharp rise in the number of microfinance institutions from 19 in 2003 to 87 in 2008
Meanwhile, contrary to Mozambique, Cote d’Ivoire has not made any significant in-
roads in addressing weaknesses in institutional environment that hinder financing deepening
(Regional FSAP 2007-08 and FSAP 2009).12 No major progress has been recorded in
improving the legal and judicial framework, nor in the credit information infrastructure.
As pointed out by the FSAP 2009, the legal and judicial framework was unpredictable and
offered little security for credit activities; contract enforcement was costly and slow; and
credit information infrastructure remained deficient-the country being rated 1 out of 6 in
terms of the depth of credit information by Doing Business Report, 2010. In addition,
the financial position of microfinance institutions was worrisome, with the largest networks
virtually bankrupt. Table 1 compares Mozambique and Cote d’Ivoire along several facets
of financial reforms over the period 2003-2010. These institutional weaknesses discourage
lending activities and explain why Cote d’Ivoire’s financial depth lied below its potential.
This comparison between Cote d’Ivoire and Mozambique sheds light on the role of
institutional factors in financial deepening. However, despite the recent improvements,
Mozambique continues to face many challenges in its institutional environment. While
establishing the commercial court was a necessary step, enforcement of collateral remains
costly and slow. Further progress is needed in addressing credit information infrastructure
and national payment system shortcomings, as well as increasing competition. As a result,
several key indicators in Mozambique remained stagnant. Particularly, excess liquidity
12Some steps have been taken by the Ivoirian authorities in 2011-12. This includes the creation of com-
mercial courts in January 2012 and the adoption of a decree on the enforcement of arbitration court decisions
(exequatur) in February 2012. Efforts to simplify business activities (starting a business, registering proper-
ties) are also underway. Financial sector policies are mostly defined at the regional level, limiting the ability
of Cote d’Ivoire to promptly take needed measures in this area; however, there is a scope to national financial
sector policies: the restructuring of public banks, the definition of the role of the state in the financial sector.
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remained high, and lending to agriculture remained anemic at below 10 percent of total
loans for most of the period. These indicators reflect the extent of the challenge of boosting
rural financing given the weak infrastructure and property rights, as well as the lack of
long-term financing resources due to the short-maturity of liabilities.
3.6 Conclusion
This paper compares the experience of countries with varying infrastructure and institu-
tional quality and policy regimes within Sub-Saharan Africa on financial sector development,
specifically credit to the private sector as a share of GDP. We find evidence that stronger rule
of law, infrastructure, and credit information collection and dissemination lead to higher
bank lending to the private sector. Particularly, the paper makes the argument that these
factors played a key role behind the advancement of financial depth in high-growth non-oil
exporting countries and may explain the relatively poor performance in the WAEMU region.
These results are in line with other empirical studies that highlighted the role of institu-
tions, particularly the effectiveness of the legal/judicial framework, in promoting financial
intermediation and bank lending.
The paper goes further into details of the policies that may be behind the slower finan-
cial development in WAEMU by contrasting the experience of Cote d’Ivoire (the biggest
economy in the WAEMU) with Mozambique (a comparable country in the control group).
We find the key contrast to be stronger policies in Mozambique on banking supervision,
commercial courts, and credit information collection and dissemination. Reforms in these
areas may explain how from 2007-2010, private sector credit to GDP rose in Mozambique
78
from less than 15 percent to almost 25 percent-a 10 percentage point gain-while in Cote
d’Ivoire the increase was less than one fourth of that.
79
3.7 Appendix: The Financial Possibility Frontier
The results presented in this section are based on the concept of financial benchmarking
methodology presented in Beck et al. 2009. The benchmarks were estimated using Fin-
Stats, a tool developed by the World Bank that implements the methodology in Beck 2009
and estimates the financial benchmarks for the quasi-totality of countries in the world. The
concept of financial benchmarking is based on the idea that there are structural factors
that determine the level of financial development a country can attain. Some factors are
conducive to financial sector development (e.g. income levels) and others inhibit it (e.g., low
density of population, which makes infrastructure deployment costly relative to the popula-
tion served and minimizes the benefit of economies of scale in banking). The benchmarking
allows for cross-country comparisons to see how a specific country is doing relative to other
countries with similar structural characteristics and at similar stage of development. The
benchmarking approach in Beck, assumes that once appropriate controls are introduced,
the process of financial development is broadly comparable across countries and stages of
development. Financial sector development is affected three types of factors: economic
development, other structural characteristics and the policy environment.
Xt = αYt + βPt + γZt + εt (3.2)
Here, X is an indicator of financial development, Y is an indicator of economic development
and Z is a vector of structural characteristics.
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Economic development is captured by income per capita. Demand for financial services
increases as income grows. On the supply side, richer countries have better infrastructure
and higher competition, which lower the price of financial services. Income per capita is
endogenous, but financial sector development affects income per capita with a delay. The
reason for this is that changes in the policy environment affect the financial sector first, and
the financial sector in turn then affects economic growth. Therefore, we can write:
Yt = α
′Pt + β′Pt−1 + γ′Zt + ε′t (3.3)
The policy environment does not change radically overnight. Good policies today are gen-
erally linked to the good policies of yesterday but also to today’s innovations.
Pt = α
′′Pt−1 + νt (3.4)
The structural variables included in the benchmarking analysis are a set of factors that are
considered as external to policy, at least in the short run. These factors include: population,
age dependency, a time factor, and special circumstances. Countries with larger population
and higher population density can have deeper and low cost of providing financial services
thanks to economies of scale. The share of non-working young and old populations (age
dependency) affects saving and lending patterns. Over time, all financial systems tend to
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improve, albeit at different speed, because of global factors that ”lift all boats”. To account
for this, a time trend is included in the regression. Many special factors affect financial
sector development: in oil exporting countries, income per capita can be out of proportion
with the financial and overall economic development of the country. In contrast, offshore
financial centers have a financial sector that is disproportionately larger than the overall
economy.
When one runs a regression of financial development on economic development and
structural factors only, policy innovations are captured by the residual. To see this, one can
substitute equations (2) and (3) into (1), and get the following reduced form expression:
Xt = (α+
βα′′
α′α′′ + β′
) + (γ − βα
′′γ′
α′α′′ + β′
) + (εt − α
′′
α′α′′ + β′
ε′t +
ββ′
α′α′′ + β′
νt) (3.5)
The policy innovation factor is now in the residual. When the benchmark is constructed
using the economic and structural variables (Y and Z), the distance between the benchmark
and the actual level of financial development is assumed to reflect the country’s policy
environment. Countries with better policies (higher ν) would tend to have more developed
financial sectors compared to countries with worse policies. FinStats estimates the last
equation via quantile regressions,13 using data from 177 countries. It then compares a
given country to its own potential (benchmark) or to its comparator countries. In the
first approach, the country’s benchmark is calculated using its economic and structural
13The quantile regressions are used to reduce the impact of outliers and produce different expected values
to gauge the range of financial sector performance.
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variables in the reduced form equation. In the second approach, comparator countries are
chosen based on their similarity with the reference country on two dimensions: GDP per
capita and populations. The comparator countries are those with the smallest distance to
the reference country, where distance is calculated as follows:
∆i,j = wgdppc|PR(gdpi)− PR(gdpj)|+ (1− wgdppc)|PR(popi)− PR(popj)|
Where, PR is the percentile rank of the country. FinStats uses the expected 25th and 75th
percentiles.
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3.8 Appendix: Tables
Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev Min Max
Credit to pvt/GDP 168 0.16 0.15 0.01 0.85
Inflation 208 0.05 0.04 -0.09 0.16
GDP per capita 206 6.28 1.03 4.73 8.94
Rule of Law 208 -0.44 0.66 -1.90 1.05
Political Stability 160 -0.26 0.88 -2.28 1.13
Internet per hundred 160 2.55 4.36 0.00 25.00
Credit Coverage 207 2.76 4.84 0.00 21.80
Property Rights 160 38.41 16.51 10.00 75.00
Table 3.2: Correlations
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Credit to pvt/GDP 1.00
Waemu -0.26 1.00
Inflation 0.08 -0.47 1.00
GDP per capita 0.76 -0.26 0.12 1.00
Rule of Law 0.72 -0.45 0.09 0.74 1.00
Political Stability 0.52 -0.10 -0.05 0.58 0.76 1.00
Internet per hundred 0.86 -0.26 0.11 0.64 0.56 0.39 1.00
Credit Coverage 0.61 0.03 -0.34 0.44 0.33 0.37 0.65 1.00
Property Rights 0.65 -0.38 0.03 0.77 0.86 0.58 0.53 0.38 1.00
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Table 3.3: Description of Variables
Variable Description Source
Credit to pvt/GDP Credit to the private sector as a percentage of GDP IMF
WAEMU Equal to 1 if the country belongs to the WAEMU and 0 otherwise Constructed
Inflation Rate of inflation IMF
GDP per capita Gross domestic product per capita IMF
Rule of Law Extent to which agents have confidence in the rules of the society World Bank
Political Stability Likelihood that the govt. will be overthrown by unconstitutional means World Bank
Internet per hundred Internet users per 100 people World Bank
Credit Coverage Percentage of adult population listed in a credit registry World Bank
Property Rights Index showing ability of individuals to accumulate pvt. property Heritage Foundation
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Table 3.4: Regression Results
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Waemu dum -0.0028*** -0.003** -0.0029*** -0.010 -0.013 -0.023*** 0.012
(0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.014) (0.006) 0.012
Inflation -0.171*** -0.18*** -0.273*** -0.126* -0.063 -0.164*** -0.156
(0.067) (0.075) (0.076) (0.072) (0.132) (0.068) (0.097)
GDP p.c 0.114*** 0.083*** 0.089*** 0.056*** 0.074*** 0.099*** 0.044***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.011) (0.004) (0.008)
Rule of law 0.078*** 0.045***
(0.006) (0.020)
Pol. Stab. 0.033*** 0.009
(0.003) (0.009)
Internet 0.020*** 0.018***
(0.002) (0.002)
Credit covg. 0.010***
(0.004)
Property 0.001*** 0.001
(0.000) (0.001)
Constant -0.52*** -0.30*** -0.35*** -0.22*** -0.34*** -0.48*** -0.15***
(0.021) (0.024) (0.027) (0.030) (0.067) (0.023) (0.054)
Observations 167 132 132 167 132 138 122
Countries 17 17 17 17 17 17 17
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.5: Structural variables in 2010
Variables Mozambique Cote d’Ivoire
GDP (constant 2000 US$) 11,603 8972
GDP p.c (constant 2000 US$) 588 384
Population (millions) 22.0 21.6
Population density 62.1 29.7
Urban population (% of total population) 50.1 38.4
Rural population (% of total population) 49.9 61.6
Dependency ratios 80.1 89.5
Source: WDI and IFS
Table 3.6: Financial Reforms, 2003 - 2010
Reforms Mozambique Cote d’Ivoire
Banking Supervision Risk based supervision introduced No reforms enacted
Accounting Standards IFRS implemented Still uses SYSCO
Payment Systems Payment settlement system strengthened Payment settlement system strengthened
Credit Information Coverage and range of the credit No reforms enacted
registry expanded.
Judicial Framework Commercial code reviewed, special No reforms enacted
commercial courts established, code
of civil procedure & Notary office
modernized, framework for secure
transactions updated
Microfinance Institutions Legislation on microfinance enacted Legislation enacted but staffing and
supervision need to be strengthened. The
financial position of this sector is critical.
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